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Abstract 
While the literature is unanimous in considering unemployment and underground employment as strongly connected 
and interdependent phenomena, the link between existing causality is controversial. This empirical paper aims at 
clarifying this intricate relationship. Precisely, two key results emerge from the analysis. The first shows that 
unemployment (positively) influences the underground employment and vice versa. The second demonstrates that the 
impact of unemployment on underground employment is stronger than the reverse.
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1. Introduction 
The socio-economic dualism present in Italy is a universally recognised phenomenon 
(the so-called “Southern question”), which manifests itself most notably in relation to 
the underground economy. Italy, in fact, ranks as one of developed countries with the 
highest  percentage  of  underground  economy  (Schneider  et  al.,  2010)  and  is further 
characterised  by  the  fact  that  two  macro-areas  with  differing  levels  of  shadow 
employment coexist within the same institutional structure (ISTAT, 2005, 2008a, 2008b). 
Furthermore,  the  highest  levels  of  shadow  employment  present  in  the  regions  of 
Southern  Italy  are  also  respectively  matched  by  the  highest  unemployment  levels 
(Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006). Indeed, the literature is unanimous in considering 
underground  employment  and  unemployment  as  strongly  connected  and 
interdependent  phenomena.1  Boeri  and  Garibaldi  go  as  far  as  to  describe  the  two 
economical phenomena as «[…] two sides of the same coin » (2006, p. 20). 
However, the sign of the relation and above all the link between existing causality are 
controversial  (Tanzi,  1999;  Giles  and  Tedds,  2002).2  This  is  due  to  the fact  that  the 
shadow labour force is rather heterogeneous: a part of the shadow labour force is often 
incorrectly classified as unemployed (and is therefore included in the official labour 
force);  another  part  is  composed  of  retired  people,  minors,  housewives  and  illegal 
immigrants that are not part of the labour force considered in the official statistics; and 
finally there are individuals that are part of both the official and shadow labour force, 
the so called “moonlighting” phenomenon (Tanzi, 1999).3 
Simple scatter diagrams are able to illustrate the tight positive relationship that exists 
between  unemployment  and  shadow  employment  in  Italy,  both  between  regions 
(Figure 1) and over time (Figure 2). However, nothing can be deduced regarding the 
link between existing causality. 
Basically, the tight relationship between unemployment and shadow employment is 
always hypothesised but is often not much analysed. 
                                                 
1  Consider  the  wide  literature  which  has  put  the  underground  economy  theory  together  with  the 
benchmark macroeconomic model for the study of unemployment, i.e. the search and matching model 
(Bouev, 2002, 2005; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Kolm and Larsen, 2003, 2010; Fugazza and Jacques, 
2004; Albrecht et. al., 2009; Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2009). 
2 Indeed, according to Bouev (2002, 2005), scaling down the unofficial sector can lead to a decrease in the 
level of unemployment; whereas according to Boeri and Garibaldi (2002, 2006), attempts to reduce shadow 
employment will result in higher open unemployment. 
3 In short, the unemployed worker and the worker employed in the hidden sector can be the same person, 
as Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hide (Robert Louis Stevenson, 1886, The strange case of Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hide).   2 
This regional panel analysis makes use of a Simultaneous Equations Model (SEM) and 
takes into account many of the factors that could influence both the unemployment 
and  shadow  employment  rates,  including  the  unobservable  heterogeneity  that  is 
specific to each cross-section (regional) unit.4 Furthermore, considering the very tight 
relation between the two variables, suitable exogenous sources are introduced and the 
3SLS (Three Stages Least Square) procedure is implemented. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the econometric model 
and  the  dataset;  section  3  investigates  the  existing  causality  relationship  between 
shadow  employment  and  unemployment;  while  section  4  shows  the  results  of  the 
analysis; finally, section 5 concludes the work. 
 
2. The econometric model 
The panel used in this study is composed of 12 variables (cf. Table 1) obtained for the 20 
Italian regions over 11 periods between 1995 and 2005, for a total of 220 observations.5 
The  two  variables  of  interest  –  shadow  employment  and  unemployment  –  are 
endogenous,  i.e.  they  are  simultaneously  determined  in  equilibrium.  Since  both 
endogenous variables are fully observed, we thus have a typical Simultaneous Equations 
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1 1                                  (1) 
hidden employment, h, and unemployment, u, are both explanatory and dependent 
variables.  The  fixed  effects  i     and  i ω   account  for  all  the  unobservable  variables 
and/or those not included in the analysis;6 whereas,  it ς  and  it ν  are the error terms.7 
                                                 
4 Although the relevance of economic-institutional factors (such as the excessive regulation and the tax 
burden)  in  accounting  for  the  underground  economy  is  widely  accepted  in  the  literature  (see  e.g. 
Schneider and Enste, 2000), the general view is that corruption, tax morality (or tax morale) and the poor 
quality of the institutions are equally significant factors (Tanzi, 1998; Johnson et al., 2000; Sarte, 2000; 
Fugazza and Jacques, 2004; Schneider, 2007; Torgler and Schneider, 2007). 
5 The limited availability of data on underground employment determined this sample period. 
6 According to Baltagi (2008), the fixed effects panel model is an adequate specification if the analysis is 
focalised on a specified group of N units and the inference is directed towards themselves. Furthermore, if 
the unobservable specific effects also represent omitted variables, it is highly likely that these effects are 
correlated  with  the  other  variables  of  the  model,  thus  making  the  use  of  a  fixed  effects  panel  model 
indispensable (Judson and Owen, 1999). Finally, in panel applications characterised by a small number of 
temporal observations, it is standard procedure to use the more simple one-way individual specification 
(Baltagi, 2008). 
7  In  the  Error  Component  Regression  Models  it  is  assumed  that  the  regression  disturbances  are 
homoscedastic,  with  the  same  variance  in  time  and  between  individuals.  This  hypothesis,  although 
restrictive  in  some  cases,  will  determine  (in  the  case  of  heteroscedasticity)  estimators  that  are  always 
consistent but inefficient (Wooldridge, 2001; Baltagi, 2008). The same can be said about serial correlation.   3 
The strong link existing between shadow employment and unemployment prevents a 
clear  distinction  between  the  determinants  of  each  variable:  as  a  consequence  the 
control variables used in the analysis,  it Z , are the same in both the structural equations. 
The  set  of  observables  it Z   comprises  the  main  determinants  of  underground 
employment and unemployment. Following Daniele and Marani (2008), two variables 
are introduced as proxy of the size and regional economic structure: the synthetic index 
of infrastructure endowment, infr , and the rate of industrialisation, ind . 
In order to determine the incidence of the organised crime, an index (ocr ) defined by 
the  sum  of  crimes  typically  charged  to  mafia  type  organisations  (i.e.  extortion  and 
criminal  organisation)  for  every  10.000  citizens  was  inserted  into  the  model.8  As 
regards  the  corruption,  an  index  (co)  was  created  from  the  sum  of  the  sentences 
executed  for  corruption,  misappropriation  (embezzlement),  abuse  of  authority  and 
acceptance of bribes for every 10.000 citizens. 
Furthermore, amongst the control variables the following are included: the regional 
GDP per capita,  gdp ; the tax revenue collected by the Italian State in percentage of 
GDP (as a measure of tax burden),  tax; an index relative to the regulation,  reg ; and 
the regional education level (the percentage of graduates and post graduates), istr . 
A  preliminary,  and  by  no  means  exhaustive,  analysis  of  the  relations  between  the 
variables used in the model is given by the simple correlations (cf. Table 2).9 
 
3. Identification and Causality 
It  is  believed  that  very  few  variables  exist  that  are  able  to  represent  a  source  of 
exogeneity  in  the  variation  of  the  endogenous  explicative  and  that  are  capable, 
therefore, of solving the problem of (incorrect) identification present in the model (1). 
Amongst  these,  two  are  particularly  appropriate:  i)  the  regional  quota  of  illegal 
immigration (irr ), as an instrument of the shadow rate; ii) the regional quota of socially 
useful workers (lsu ), as an instrument of the unemployment rate. 
                                                 
8 Indeed, the important and negative role played by organised crime in the Italian Mezzogiorno must be 
kept in mind  (Daniele and Marani, 2008; Marini and Turato, 2002). 
9 Regarding the variable reg, the data is only available on a five-yearly basis and was therefore extended: 
for example, the data for 1995 was used for 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999, until new data was available in 2000. 
Whereas, regarding the variable ind, the data is only available for the period 1997-2000 and for the year 
2004; hence, the data for the period 1997-2000 was also used for 1995, 1996, 2001, 2002 and 2003, while the 
data for 2004 was also used for 2005.   4 
In short, the fitted values of h and u to be used in the modified structural equations are 
obtained by the reduced form equations in which lsu  “replaces” u , and  irr  “replaces” 
h , in such a way as to overcome the identification problem. 
The reasons for the choice of  irr  and  lsu  are quite clear: illegal immigrants are not 
part of the official labour force and can only be used for shadow jobs, whereas socially 
useful workers are in actual fact unemployed individuals that work (albeit for fixed-
term contracts and for specific projects) and have no interest/advantage (or the time) 
to work in the hidden sector.  
Following Bianchi et al. (2008), both regularisation applications and permits of stay are 
used to identify the hidden component of immigration, taking advantage of the strong, 
positive  and  stable  correlation  in  time  and  space  between  the  legal  and  illegal 
immigration quotas (Bianchi et al., 2008). Indeed, Bianchi et al. (2008) show that the 
discrepancy between the actual illegal immigration quota and that estimated through 
the permits of stay is almost negligible. 
As regards the socially useful workers, in order to aid the mapping of the phenomenon 
at a regional level, only provincial and regional projects were referred to.10 
Both the “found” (irr , lsu ) and “created” (h ˆ , u ˆ ) instruments adequately explain the 
endogenous  variable  to  be  instrumented  (h  and  u,  respectively).  The  univariate 
regressions, implemented for this purpose, confirm that the chosen instruments are not 
weak:  the  first-stage  F-statistics  of  the  regressions,  used  to  investigate  whether  a 
instrument  is  weak  or  not,  is  in  fact  greater  than  the  lower  limit  indicated  in  the 
literature  (Shea,  1997;  Godfrey,  1999;  Stock  and  Yogo,  2002;  Andrews  and  Stock, 
2005).11 Precisely, the first-stage F-statistics of the univariate regressions are equal to 
14.78 (h on irr), 15.14 (u on lsu), 13.52 (h on h ˆ), and 14.24 (u on u ˆ ). 
Finally, considering that the set of control variables for  h  and u  is basically the same, 
the Three Stages Least Square (3SLS) procedure is applied.12 More precisely, the reduced 
                                                 
10 The difficulty in obtaining data derives from the fact that the projects for these work typologies can also 
be promoted and carried out by municipalities, in other words by the smaller public administrations. 
11 In order to investigate if an instrument is weak or not, Stock and Yogo (2002) developed tests based on 
the F-statistics, under the null hypothesis that the coefficient associated with the instrument is null in the 
univariate regression. More precisely, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis of a weak instrument, at the 
confidence level of 5%, if F > 10.3 (Andrews and Stock, 2005). 
12 With respect to the Two stages approach, this procedure has the advantage of being more efficient due to 
the fact that the correlation between errors of the two structural equations is taken into account.   5 
form equations are estimated using Within estimation, whereas the modified structural 
equations are estimated via SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression).13 
 
4. Results of the analysis 
The estimation obtained by the model (1) – see Table 3 – shows a very interesting albeit 
not  surprising  result  that  clarifies  the  investigated  causality  relationship: 
unemployment (positively) influences the underground employment and vice versa. 
The coefficients are, in fact, both significant and positive. Therefore, 
  Remark  1.  The  causal  relationship  that  links  the  unemployment  rate  with  the 
underground  employment  rate  appears  to  be  bidirectional.  Furthermore,  this  relationship 
appears to be asymmetric, since the effect of u on h is “stronger” than that of h on u. 
More precisely, an increase in unemployment of 1% is associated with an increase of 
0.69%  in  underground  employment.  Vice  versa,  an  increase  of  1%  in  shadow 
employment  is  associated  with  an  increase  of  0.18%  in  unemployment.  A  possible 
economic explanation of this result is the following: an increase in the unemployment 
rate  makes  a  higher  manpower  available  to  the  underground  sector;  whereas,  an 
increase in the underground employment may imply a reduction of official jobs, thus 
increasing the “official” unemployment rate recorded by the government. 
In addition, several interesting remarks can be made: 
•  The variables corruption and organised crime are significant (and positive) only 
with respect to the dependent variable shadow employment. This result confirms 
the  lack  of  univocal  conclusions  in  the  empirical  literature  that  investigates  the 
relationship between unemployment and organised crime (Marselli and Vannini, 
2000),14 but also emphasises the strong relationship between these factors and the 
spread  of  the  underground  sector.  These  results  can  be  easily  extended  to  the 
European  context,  since  corruption  and  organised  crime  are  particularly 
widespread in the Eastern European countries where the underground economy is 
higher than in the rest of Europe (Van Dijk, 2006; Johnson et al., 2000); 
                                                 
13 At the moment, specific STATA routines able to carry out the 3SLS procedure with panel data do not 
exist. As an alternative – as in this case – the xtdata, fe, function (or re in case of random effects models) can 
be used, followed by the sureg command. The same procedure was used by Tao and Andrew (2007). 
14 It should however be pointed out that this result only refers to organised crime and not “petty crime”. It 
is for this reason that the ambiguity is further stressed in this analysis.   6 
•  The GDP is significant only in reference to the dependent variable  u (obviously 
negative  in  sign).  This  confirms  the  ambiguity  in  the  literature  regarding  the 
relationship between GDP and the underground economy (Eilat and Zinnes, 2000); 
•  Education  is  statistically  significant  only  in  the  reduction  of  underground 
employment. This result has recently been confirmed through empirical studies in 
Italy (Cappariello and Zizza, 2009). 
•  The variables  tax and  reg are statistically significant (with positive sign) only in 
reference to unemployment; whereas the significance of  ind  (with negative sign), 
with respect to both u  and h, means that the more industrialized is the region, the 
lower is unemployment and underground employment. 
Finally, it can state that: 
Remark 2. The strong difference between the North and the South of Italy, in terms of 
shadow economy, crucially depends on the different level of corruption and organized crime. 
Indeed,  the  southern  regions  of  Italy  constitute  a  typical  case  in  which  the  socio-
economic context of organized crime (Peri, 2004; Daniele and Marani, 2008, see also 




The  tight  relationship  between  unemployment  and  shadow  employment  is  always 
hypothesised  but  is  often  not  much  analysed,  due  to  objective  and  non  trivial 
difficulties (that have been briefly discussed in the introduction). For this reason the 
bidirectional  causality  result  obtained,  although  not  surprising,  contributes  in 
clarifying this very important topic. 
A possible and interesting extension of this analysis could be based on the hypothesis 
that causality, although bidirectional, is not simultaneous. Essentially, unemployment 
and shadow employment influence each other respectively, but not simultaneously. 
This could be investigated by implementing a panel VAR methodology. However, the 
availability of a panel dataset with additional temporal observations is essential.   7 
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Figure 1. Underground employment and unemployment in the regions of Italy             
(Source: Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006) 
 
 
Figure 2. Underground employment and unemployment in the time in Italy                   
(Source: Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006)   11
 




Organized crime index (Source: Daniele and Marani, 2008) 
 
Figure 3. Underground employment and organized crime in the regions of Italy  12
Table 1. Variables: definitions and sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
u  Regional unemployment rate (in %)  ISTAT 
h 
Regional underground employment rate (ratio 
between the regional underground employment 
and the regional total employment) 
ISTAT 
irr 
Number of illegal immigrants for every 10.000 
citizens (regional rate) 
Italian Ministry of Interior 
lsu 
Number of socially useful workers for every 10.000 
citizens (regional rate) 
INPS (National Social 
Security Institute), Regions, 
Provinces 
gdp  Regional GDP per capita  ISTAT 
infr 
Synthetic index of regional infrastructural 
endowment (Italy index = 100) 
Unioncamere                     
and “Tagliacarne” Institute 
ind 
Rate of industrialisation (ratio between the regional 
total employment in the manufacturing sector and 
the regional total employment) 
Our elaboration on ISTAT 
data 
istr 
Regional education level (the percentage of 
graduates and post graduates on the regional 
resident population above 15 years of age) 
ISTAT 
co 
Sum of the sentences executed for corruption, 
misappropriation (embezzlement), abuse of 
authority and acceptance of bribes for every 10.000 
citizens (regional rate) 
Our elaboration on Judicial 
Register data 
ocr 
Sum of crimes typically charged to mafia type 
organisations (i.e. extortion and criminal 
organisation) for every 10.000 (regional rate) 
Our elaboration on 
Geographical Information 
System on Justice 
tax 
Tax revenue collected by the Italian State in 
percentage of GDP 
OECD 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Results from 3SLS estimation 
   h  u 
u  0.69 (8.65) [0.000]  – 
h  –  0.18 (5.72) [0.000] 
gdp  0.08 (1.39) [0.167]  –0.18 (–2.25) [0.025] 
infr  –0.45 (–1.19) [0.235]  –0.61 (–1.09) [0.274] 
ind  –0.20 (–7.08) [0.000]  –0.17 (–4.32) [0.000] 
istr  –0.44 (–2.70) [0.007]  –0.51 (–1.37) [0.173] 
co  0.25 (5.84) [0.000]  0.09 (0.72) [0.469] 
ocr  0.39 (5.70) [0.000]  0.13 (0.71) [0.479] 
reg  0.30 (1.62) [0.106]  0.34 (1.80) [0.072]* 







R2  0.3251  0.2150 
χ χ χ χ 2  572.71 [0.0000]  478.65 [0.0000] 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(1) = 7.865,   Pr = 0.0050   
(null hypothesis: no correlation between the error terms of the two modified 
structural equations) 
Notes:  The  reduced  form  equations  are  estimated  equation  by  equation,  whereas  the  modified  structural 
equations are estimated via SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression); indeed, 3SLS = 2SLS + SUR. All variables 
are expressed in log and are defined in Table 1. The numbers in round brackets are the z-ratios, whereas the 
numbers in square brackets are the p-value. The numbers in bold denote significance at 5% level, whereas * 
denotes significance only at 10% level. 